Most of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have experienced severe banking crises over the 1990s. These economies have been vulnerable to external shocks coupled with financial liberalisation and economic restructuring. The purpose of our research is to establish whether these crises are primarily a function of the unique difficulties of transition or whether they reflect similar factors to those recorded in the lead up to financial crises elsewhere round the globe. Most of the existing research on the factors that help explain the occurrence of these problems deals with Asian or South American banking crises. Moreover, some extensive crosscountry studies, Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998), for example, deliberately refrain from including Central and Eastern European transition countries because they feel that these former socialist transition economies, suffered a special range of problems that make them noncomparable with most of the other countries.
opening up of the economy to market forces tends to render many of the previous enterprises uncompetitive in their present activities. This results in a major contraction in the economy and the revelation of a substantial stock of non-performing loans.
The authorities are similarly unprepared for this environment, both in being able to prepare banks for the rigours of the new regime or in detecting problems and assisting in their solution.
Major fiscal pressures from declining revenues and increased unemployment compound the difficulty and inhibit recapitalisation. If this were not enough there has normally been a bout of high inflation as the whole structure of prices tries to adjust in a period of shortage.
In many cases this results in a two-stage problem. In the first instance the banks are overwhelmed by the scale of the macro-economic pressures on the whole range of their customers. In the second, their fragility, lack of experience and the pressure for success among a substantial number of new entrants leads to further problems, exacerbated by any external shocks.
In this paper we seek to explore how the experience of banks across the CEECs conforms to this pattern. We would anticipate that initially economy-wide problems will dominate as the cause of distress, while later the difficulties will become more bank and regime specific and hence more reminiscent of the experience in other countries. After the second shake out it appears that many of the CEECs have banking and regulatory structures similar to those of their Western European counterparts, assisted by considerable foreign ownership by Western European banks.
The Framework for Addressing the Problem
It is inevitable that comparative studies of emerging markets should be dominated by concerns over the data. As a result such cross-country studies tend to focus more on macro-economic data than on other factors as they are more readily available and prima facie compatible. In these papers, GDP growth, inflation, exchange rate movements and the terms of trade serve as the warning signals of banking crises, as they all indicate sources of pressure on bank income flows and balance sheets. These broad-based macro-indicators can sometimes be complemented with a set of aggregate banking sector variables such as credit to the private sector, deposits and banking sector foreign reserves.
1 Detailed differences aside, the general conclusions of macro-data driven studies are consistent and intuitive. In brief the results reaffirm that a deteriorating macroeconomic situation and underlying instabilities precipitate banking crises. These results have much in common with the findings for OECD countries, as is illustrated in Mayes et al. (2001, ch. 2) for the Nordic countries.
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) focus on a further potential trigger of financial fragility that is relevant for our study, namely, financial liberalisation. Although financial liberalisation as it is traditionally viewed -removal of interest rate controls in their case -is a more minor shift than the transition economies faced it is nevertheless a regime change and hence instructive. Their results indicate that financial liberalisation exerts a negative effect on the stability of the financial sector that is additional to those from adverse macroeconomic developments and related vulnerabilities to balance-of-payments crises. A strong institutional environment can however alleviate the adverse impact of liberalization on the financial system (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998) . Unfortunately the study does not include the European emerging markets.
Notwithstanding the valuable insights from previous studies there is little evidence on how authorities such as central banks and supervisory agencies could make use of financial fragility indicators in order to safeguard the stability of the banking system as a whole. Similar problems exist in finding clear evidence on why some banks survive the adverse macroeconomic conditions and external shock whereas the others fail. There are several studies mainly based on US and a few Latin-American countries banking data (e.g. GonzalezHermosillo, 1997 GonzalezHermosillo, , 1999 , which try to explore specific banking sector indicators (CAMELS 2 framework) which can serve as valuable early warning signs of banking distress. The particular value of these studies lies in recognition of these factors, which can be addressed by appropriate banking regulation and adequate supervision. The degree of fragility of individual banks is closely linked to the overall propensity to banking crisis (also due to contagion effects), in which the bank-specific factors play important role in systemic stability.
Specification of the Model
We follow the normal framework of assuming that bank distress or 'crisis', d, depends upon three groups of variables: 
Definition of Banking Crisis or Bank Distress
There is a considerable debate over how best to measure banking distress or fragility and over how to define a crisis. In order to make our work comparable we employ well known indicators that can be applied to the data available on individual banks in the CEECs during the period since 1996. Studies of early warning systems that rely on macro-level data (such as Detragiache, 1998, 1999; and Hutchinson and Mc-Dill; 1999) are mainly based upon the Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) datasets of systemic and borderline banking crises. Given conceptual ambiguity and data limitations the criteria they use for defining a crisis employ a combination of events, such as, forced closure, merger or government intervention in the operations of financial institutions, runs on banks, or the extension of large-scale government assistance. However, neither Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) nor Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) define incidences of systemic banking crises explicitly for the CEECs, which means we have to rely on our own estimates to separate crisis from non-crisis periods.
The choice of indicators for crises and problem banks normally covers measures of nonperforming assets, problem loans and solvency 3 . Nonperforming loans have been often used as the crisis threshold, because they are the best indicator of near term failure. (GonzalesHermosillo, 1999) There is no one generally accepted measure of the existence of 'problems' so we have to be somewhat pragmatic in our choice. Gonzales-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu and Billings (1997) define fragile banks as those with nonperforming loans of more than 6-8 percent of total loans. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) define a crisis period inter alia as one in which the nonperforming loans of the banking system are more than 10% of total 3 The explicit criteria, which have been used in the literature are the following: (1) NPL to total banking sector assets above 10% or ratio of NPL to total assets greater than 2% of GDP; (2) The cost of rescue operation at least 2% of GDP; (3) Large scale nationalization; (4) Extensive bank runs; (5) Emergency measures applied such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays, deposit guarantees assets. Rojas-Suarez (1998) classify as "crisis" banks whose nonperforming loans to total loans are greater than the average for the system as whole during 'tranquil' periods plus two standard deviations.
Since we have bank specific data it makes more sense to focus on measures we can obtain directly. There rather than conditioning on institutional measures such as the existence of government support, recapitalisation or other such interventions, we apply a modified version of the Gonzales-Hermosillo (1999) coverage ratio, which is the ratio of equity capital and loan reserves 4 minus nonperforming loans to total assets. The advantage of the coverage ratio is that it takes into account reserves and equity capital, which could cover the amount of the problem loans. 5 Instead of total assets we use the larger of net loan provisions or impaired loans as the denominator. In order to account for bank capital cushion and the potential losses from nonperforming loans, the crisis for a bank is defined as a situation where the ratio of equity and loan reserves surplus is less than the higher of net loan provisions or impaired loans. We label this as a 'distressed' bank. Banks with negative or zero equity are labelled as 'insolvent' 6 . Our definition of 'problem' banks thus encompasses the institutions, which are insolvent and institutions, which are at increased risk due to high actual or potential loan losses eroding the capital. The latter category of banks might be called distressed, because, while their own funds cover the loan losses in the current period, they would not withstand the same magnitude of losses next period, holding the equity level constant. 4 Loan reserves are held against actual and potential loan losses and, as such, are set aside from the normal definition of capital 5 Depending on the scope of nonperforming loans definition Gonzales-Hermosillo (1999) applies a coverage ratio threshold of zero for US banks and a threshold of 1,5 for Mexican and Colombian banks. 6 For banks whose data on impaired loans are not available, but the net loan provisions are negative, given the positive equity, are considered as prudent. The maximum of impaired loans ratio or provisions ratio is used in order to employ more observations and alleviate the problem of incomparability in provisions definitions across sample countries. This gives us a three way categorisation of: sound, distressed and insolvent banks. Appendix 2 sets out the data by year and country for all of the banks in our sample. If any bank is in the distressed or insolvent category then we label this as a 'crisis' period, although this overdramatises the situation as the bank is not necessarily of systemic or significant proportions.
However, small banks are excluded from our sample as discussed below.
Early Warning Indicators
The choice of early warning indicators of impending crises that can be used in analysis is heavily constrained by the data available. The wider the sample of countries, the narrower will be the choice. As set out in Table 1 , indicators of the probability of failure for an individual bank can be divided into: those that are bank specific, those that characterize the banking sector through externalities or contagion factors, and macroeconomic factors that affect all banks. The latter two normally apply equally to all banks, although their exposures differ.
Overall there is no universal set of indicators used across previous studies, although there is more communality over broad-based macro-variables, such as GDP, exchange rate and inflation indexes, which have better cross-country comparability and availability. By contrast the set of bank-specific variables varies a great deal across the studies available on a crosscountry basis. Even ostensibly similar bank specific variables may not be very comparable across countries as the accounting regulations and supervisory rules can account for large variations.
The basis for comparison of for bank-specific variables used in Table 1 is fairly limited and relies mostly on US, Mexican and Columbian data. 7 However there is also a study by Berg and Hexeberg (1994) higher loan-to-assets ratio or loan growth ratio seem to be more predominantly a trigger of a crisis with only exception for U.S Southwest. The most convincing result appears as for capital-asset ratio being consistent across different samples and studies. However, taken together, the degree of heterogeneity is not a good omen for using this approach on the CEECs.
The results for macroeconomic indicators are in better conformity, moreover the studies under consideration incorporate large cross-country samples all over the world. However, we can see that the results vary also here, as some studies come up with conflicting evidence.
According to most studies financial deepening seems to increase vulnerability to crises, however there are exceptions, which conflict with this statement. It is not immediately apparent what result we should expect. Financial deepening is a sign of economic maturity so a negative sign would be plausible. The same ambiguity applies to currency depreciation as a possible precipitator of financial and banking crisis. Here, the ambivalent results might stem from crosscountry differences in monetary policy (inflation targeting versus exchange rate targeting), country comparative competitive advantages, the level of financial deepening or general stability and maturity of the economic environment. In any case the impact would depend on how well the banks and their customers were hedged, itself a feature of financial deepening.
Fortunately, given the aim of our study, the largest weight is carried by bank-specific variables, which can serve as valuable predictors of emerging vulnerabilities. Hence, the main source for crisis indicators is the balance sheet and income statement information. The bank-specific view is complemented by several indicators reflecting the macroeconomic environment and structural developments.
One critical issue is the time-effect of signalling variables, whereas this plays a major role when considering the high likelihood of endogenous feedback. Due to likely endogeneity the warning variables might behave controversially depending on the time lag before the incidence of distress and perhaps GMM or some other means of coping with simultaneity will be required. Berg, Hexeberg; 1994 Norway: 1987 n.a. -*** Loan growth +** + n.a. -*** + n.a n.a - n.a. +** n.a + + Gonzalez- Hermosillo,1999 Colombia (1982 n.a +*** n.a n.a n.a 9
Gonzalez

Mexico
Dependent variable:
(1) Berg, Hexeberg; 1994 : Problem bank is considered as a bank seeking assistance from an insurance fund (2) Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu and Billings, 1997: Bank Failure -Occurrence of bank intervention in form of financial assistance, recapitalization etc (3) Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999: Bank Failure -the incidence of intervention; Distress -Coverage ratio i.e ratio of capital equity and loan reserves minus nonperforming loans to total assets (4) Demirgüc-Kunt, Detragiache, 1998 Detragiache, , 1999 Hutschinson; Mc-Dill; 1999 : Definition of (systemic) financial crisis based on Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) . For an episode to be classified as crisis at least one of following conditions must apply:
• NPL to total banking sector assets above 10% • Ratio of NPL to total assets greater than 2% of GDP • The cost of rescue operation at least 2% of GDP • Large scale nationalization • Extensive bank runs • Emergency measures applied such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays, deposit guarantees
• -statistical significance at 10%, ** -statistical significance at 5%, *** -statistical significance at 1%. Exp -expected sign
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The Empirical Study
The Data
Much of the novelty of the present paper is attributable to the underlying data. The mean values of warning variables for sound and problem banks in all sample countries are shown in the Appendix. Despite the fast restructuring process leading to high diversity as for economic and political achievements across CEE countries there are no remarkable differences in bank-specific variables between the new EU members and the rest of CEE countries (see Figure 1) . The only statistically significant exception is the loan-to-assets ratio, which was higher for problem-banks in EU countries but lower for unsound banks in the non-EU sample. This is probably a feature of the immature lending markets, where banks with a larger lending portfolio exhibit a greater resemblance to banks in developed economies and are thus also more market-oriented.
Figure 1: Bank-specific variables of sound and unsound banks in EU-10 and non-EU CEEC
In contrast to bank-specific variables there is more diversity in the macroeconomic variables between the EU and non-EU sub-samples. While higher concentration is indicated by the Herfindahl index for problem banks in non-EU sample, the opposite of low banking market concentration is coupled with banking problems in EU sample countries. A high Herfindahl index in the non-EU sample also corresponds to a high share of public owned banks. This indicates, that the higher the banking concentration the less efficient and marketoriented is the banking environment. Where a CEEC belongs to the EU group, strong market competition triggers bank failures. Weak monetary policy seems to be more an issue for non-EU countries banking stability. Both the currency shock (sharp depreciation) and high inflationary pressures tend to be more important triggers of banking problems. 
In general, the average indicator levels for sound and problem banks across countries vary a great deal, so no universal threshold level can be found, which adequately signals the vulnerabilities over the whole sample of countries. This might also be taken as one further argument in favour of using differences instead of levels for the explanatory variables in the logit model described in the next section.
The sample countries can also be compared according to EBRD banking sector reform index (Figure 2 ). Unfortunately no observations are available for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.
In general the new EU members demonstrate better advancement in banking reforms than other participants in the study. The exceptions are Croatia and Bulgaria, which belong to the frontline of transition countries in respect of banking sector reforms. Another interesting insight into the pattern of bank problems in different sample countries can be found from the bank transition matrix (Table 3 ). In the whole sample of 21 countries the historical probability of a sound bank remaining in a prudent state was about 96% against the probability of 4% falling into difficulties and become unsound. About half of the problem banks 11 eventually recovered, whereas the rest remained unsound over the next year.
The highest chance (15%) of a sound bank becoming a problem bank was found in Estonia. However, none of the problem banks remained unsound over the next period, they either closed-down or improved. This might imply some differences in the way in which the 11 The transition matrix can not take into account those banks, which disappeared from the database. 
Model Specification
We use the binomial fixed effects panel logit model, to explore the relationship, which can be expressed with following general specification:
The dependent variable y denotes the bank status and is equal to 0 or 1 for sound and problem banks respectively. x is a set of early warning indicators having indexes
and where N≈300 banks in the panel; K= 17 number of countries in the panel; T= 8 number of years (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) .
In theory we have a choice of models of discrete dependent variables, largely between logit and probit, which are the most commonly used in empirical research on financial crisis and early warning systems. The important distinction from our point of view is that the probit 12 The caveat here is that transition matrix is sensitive to the choice of sample period, wherefore for these countries, which suffered more banking sector problems in the beginning of observation period have lower probability of a sound bank to become problem bank and higher likelihood of problem banks to recover. Also the data availability and goodness play an important role as the banks with missing data drop out of the matrix. model is based on the normal distribution, whereas logit model applies the logistic distribution. The logistic distribution has fat tails compared to the normal distribution and therefore tends to be more appropriate for modelling financial data, which are often leptokurtic. Furthermore, Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu and Billings, (1997) claim in testing for several functional forms, including Weibull, normal and exponential distributions, that the logistic distribution best matches with the features of banking crisis data in Mexico.
Similarly, they refer to earlier studies, which found that the logistic distribution best describes the banking difficulties in the United States for the period 1985-92. However in large samples the two models should give broadly similar results.
Another issue, which favours the logit specification, is the fact that the probit model does not lend itself well to the fixed effect treatment, as there is no feasible way of removing the heterogeneity, and with a large number of cross-sectional units, as in the current study, the estimation of fixed effects is intractable (Green, 1995) . In contrast to the probit model, the logit model enables treatment of fixed effects. The fixed effect treatment in the current study is needed for extracting country-specific time-constant features.
The maximization of a conditional likelihood function (Chamberlain, 1980) probabilities cannot be estimated without knowing c, which distribution is unrestricted and thus hard to know (Wooldridge, 2000) .
In order to test how well the logit model fits the data it is simplest to look at the maximum likelihood measure. Intuitively, a better measure of model explanatory power is the likelihood ratio index (LRI), whose value is bounded by 0 and 1. The closer is LRI to 1 the better the goodness of fit. The first model we use, with predominantly first differences, gives an LRI of 0,71 and the model based on second differences has an LRI value of 0,696. These are relatively promising results.
Where restricted log-likelihood is:
The key consideration in choosing between a random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) approach is whether c i and x it are correlated. Hausman (1978) proposed a test based on the difference between random effects and fixed effect estimates. Since FE is consistent when c i and x it are correlated, but RE is inconsistent, a statistically significant difference is interpreted as evidence against the random effects assumption. However, the Hausman test needs strict exogeneity, whereas correlation between x is and u it for any s and t causes both FE and RE to be inconsistent.
Applying the Hausman test however did not find a statistically significant difference between random effects and fixed effect specification of the model. Nevertheless, the theoretical arguments and maximum likelihood measures indicate that the fixed effects model seems to be a more appropriate specification given the aim of the study.
Bank-specific variables from financial statements are closely interlinked, which causes estimation problems from high collinearity if several are included. To cope with the problem two methods were applied. First the factor loadings were calculated and employed in order to filter out the dominating variables of similar nature e.g. the most representative efficiency variable from different proxy-measures. Secondly, since it is not immediately apparent what the appropriate metric is, the inverse values of the variables were used instead original ratios.
To overcome problems of endogeneity in using bank specific variables, because the financial variables from banks accounts might be itself a reflection of crisis, the explanatory variables are modelled in differences and not in levels. Statistically significant explanatory variables (in difference form) were in turn tested for exogeneity. For this purpose the simple procedure described by Wooldridge (2000) was used.
13 As a result the contemporaneous values of differences of loan-asset ratio, equity-investments ratio and cost-income ratio turned to be not exogeneous. Hence, for these variables only the lagged difference values can be used in order to avoid misleading results due to endogeneity. 13 In the first step the explanatory variable of interest is regressed against the rest of the explanatory variables. In the second step the residuals from the OLS are substituted into the logit estimation. If the t-statistic of the residual turns to be statistically significant the variable of interest is not exogenous.
Results
The results from the fixed effects panel logit model (Table 4) The interpretation of market risk indicators is more ambiguous, as it was the only risk component that turned out to be jointly insignificant. Therefore no conclusions can be drawn based on the coefficients on equity-investments ratio or trade-income ratio.
14 All banks, whether or not ecnountering distress or insolvency, are included in the estimation. 15 For bank-specific variables the χ 2 ( 10) = 36.16 and Prob > χ 2 = 0.0001. For macroeconomic variables the χ 2 (6) = 18.30 Prob > χ 2 = 0.0055. Our two bank structure indicators offer some support to traditional hypotheses. The negative sign for the Herfindahl index, although the coefficient is insignificant suggests that high competition might lead to more frequent occurrences of bank failure. The behaviour of the financial deepening measure, proxied by private lending to GDP, is also intuitive. A crisis is correlated with financial deepening ex-ante and financial contraction at the time of the crisis. The share of state-owned banks indicates that privatisation or a higher proportion of private banks has been accompanied with crisis episodes in the transition countries. However, it appears that this positive correlation of private banks with distress incidences falls primarily in the non-EU group of CEE countries (see Appendix Table) .
The macroeconomic variables point in the expected directions, although mainly further ahead rather than in the current period. Declining GDP growth and instabilities in the external and domestic environment lead to a higher likelihood of crises. Rises in Euribor-3M interest rates raises the costs of funding, which precipitates financial problems for many CEE countries. Inflationary pressures pre-crisis and the eventual drop also belong to a story of crisis. Currency depreciation seems to trigger banking problems but the sign is reversed in the current period. Depreciation on its own puts pressure on both banks' balance sheets and those of their borrowers if loans have been taken out in foreign currency. There is a delay before payments are due and this bites. This might indicate loose monetary control in the preceding period and restrictive monetary policy ex post, which leads to eventual stress in the banking sector.
Given the individual statistical insignificance of many predictive variables and unobserved effects characteristic of the logit model, which does not allow for good interpretation of partial effects, we need to explore the patterns of the proposed early warning indicators in explaining bank distress further. A simple first step is to look at the model's predictive power. Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Poland and Slovenia. As shown in Table 6 the model managed to recognize banking problems in two out of the six countries: Cyprus and Estonia, 17 but it also extracted a high degree of noise. The model failed to pick up any of the crises in Poland, Slovenia, Malta and Croatia. This is a similar result to the in-sample prediction, which also highlighted the model sensitivity for Estonia and Cyprus, and its weakness in identifying problems predominantly in Poland, Slovenia and Croatia. For the 11 countries, which did not experience banking problems in 2003 the wrong signal was extracted only once for Russia (type-II error 3%) and three times for Romania (type-II error 33%). In general the results tend to be weaker for banking sectors in highly regulated markets.
16 Defintion of substandard loans was brought in line with EU standards in January 2004. 17 The model recognised 3 episodes of bank distress out of 21. Two incidences were picked up as for Cyprus and one incidence for Estonia.
In-sample crisis probability Hermosillo (1997 Hermosillo ( , 1999 has successfully employing the logit technique and survival models in parallel. As claimed by Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) , the formerly socialist transition economies suffered a special range of problems that make them non-comparable with most of the other countries. The source for these non-comparabilities is mainly related to institutional factors, such as privatisation and liberalisation, enactment of new banking regulations and reforms in the monetary system. Therefore, further analysis of banking vulnerabilities could incorporate a wider range of indicators reflecting the major institutional changes during the transition process and a broader background for the differences in the development of the banking sector across the sample countries.
Conclusions
Using panel data at the bank level, it is possible to find bank-specific, bank sector structure and macro-economic variables that are able to predict vulnerabilities in the CEE countries' banking sector over the period since 1996. Macro-economic variables tend to perform better in predicting a couple of years ahead, as they are more persistent compared to the more volatile financial variables. However, the financial variables have more to say about the crisis pattern, explaining how both the causes and the reactions contribute to a crisis or its avoidance. The measures of bank sector structure have a limited effect also reflecting both contributory factors and responses. Not surprisingly the indicators are inter-related and while individual factors may be weakly determined their joint effect is clear. Bank sector structure variables indicate that the sector becomes more fragile as state ownership declines and the sector becomes more diverse.
There are some interesting differences between the ten new EU members and the rest of observed CEE countries. Although these two groups had broadly similar patterns of differences between the sound and problem banks, the high loan-to-assets ratio in EU sample was associated with problem banks, whereas the same was characteristic of sound banks in the non-EU sub-sample. Similarly, although not statistically significant, the higher tradeincome ratio was a feature of distressed banks in EU group, while being rather the indicator of prudent institutions for non-EU group. With the macro-economic variables, the non-EU banks turned out to be more vulnerable to inflationary pressures and exchange rate movements.
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